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Summary 
Rapid, evidence-based decision-making is critical during a disease outbreak response 
however compliance by stakeholders is necessary to ensure that such decisions are 
effective – especially if the response depends on voluntary action. This mixed method study 
evaluated technical policy decision-making processes during the 2007 outbreak of equine 
influenza in Australia by identifying and analysing the stakeholder network involved and the 
factors driving policy decision-making.  
The study started with a review of the outbreak literature and published policy documents. 
This identified six policy issues regarding policy modifications or differing interpretations by 
different state agencies. Data on factors influencing the decision-making process for these 
six issues and on stakeholder interaction were collected using a pre-tested, semi-structured 
questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 24 individuals representing 12 
industry and government organisations. Quantitative data were analysed using social 
network analysis. Qualitative data were coded and patterns matched to test a pre-
determined general theory using a method called theory-oriented process-tracing. 
Results revealed that technical policy decisions were framed by social, political, financial, 
strategic and operational considerations. Industry stakeholders had influence through formal 
pre-existing channels, yet specific gaps in stakeholder interaction were overcome by reactive 
alliances formed during the outbreak response but outside the established system. Overall, 
the crisis management system and response was seen as positive and 75100% of 
individuals interviewed were supportive of, had interest in and considered the outcome as 
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good for the majority of policy decisions, yet only 4675% of those interviewed considered 
that they had influence on these decisions.  
Training to increase awareness and knowledge of emergency animal diseases and response 
systems will improve stakeholder participation in emergency disease management and 
preparedness for future emergency animal disease incursions. 
Key words: emergency animal disease outbreak, policy decision-making, equine influenza, 
risk management, preparedness 
 
Introduction: 
Good preparedness and response is necessary for rapid and effective action in the case of 
an emergency animal disease (EAD) incursion in order to minimise adverse consequences 
such as financial losses, trade restrictions and social impacts. 
EADs are diseases, which are likely to have a significant effect on livestock by potentially 
resulting in livestock deaths, production loss and in some cases impacts on human health 
and the environment. Equine influenza is classified an EAD in Australia as, prior to the 2007 
outbreak, it had never been introduced to the general Australian horse population and it is 
considered to be in the national interest that the country remains free of the disease.   
The risk of an EAD incursion has greatly increased in recent decades due to increased 
globalisation bringing with it higher volumes and more frequent importations of animals and 
animal products. An increasing frequency of incursions and the high costs of control warrant 
exploration of changes to traditional systems and models of risk management. In this study, 
we evaluated the appropriateness of technical policy decision-making processes during the 
2007 equine influenza response and the drivers influencing these processes. Please note 
that the objective of this study was not to evaluate the ‘correctness’ or ‘appropriateness’ of 
the decisions made. 
Rapid decision-making based on epidemiological data on disease distribution is critical 
during an EAD outbreak response; however, to achieve effective national disease control, 
epidemiological evidence must be placed in a broader framework  sometimes called 
macroepidemiology  which takes into account technical capability, socio-political support 
and economic justification (Hueston and Walker, 1993, Hueston, 2003, Cameron et al., 
2005). For example, the importance of socio-political support was evident during the 2001 
Foot- and Mouth Disease crisis in the United Kingdom, when mass culling led to an increase 
in suicide rates among farmers and general public uproar (Barclay, 2005).   
The case for applying broader risk assessment frameworks is particularly strong when an 
emergency disease response relies heavily on producers’ trust and their willingness to serve 
important roles in the prevention, detection and control of the EAD (Delgado et al., 2012). 
Success may rest on a careful identification of the interests and capabilities of all 
stakeholders at the policy development stage (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000) and 
maintaining  good communications prior to, during and after an emergency (Conkey, 2004). 
Good stakeholder communications and relationships require advanced planning and 
preparation (Delgado et al., 2012). Being well prepared in advance for EAD outbreaks and 
then refining and implementing prior plans to constitute effective policies during an outbreak 
is critical to achieving control of a disease outbreak as promptly as possible and thereby 
minimizing its impacts.  
Equine influenza is a highly infectious, viral respiratory disease affecting horses and 
outbreaks of this disease cause considerable financial losses and hardships to horse 
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industry participants (Hoare, 2011, Taylor et al., 2008). Sporadic outbreaks in countries with 
endemic disease are common, despite ongoing vaccination (Newton et al., 2006, Barbic et 
al., 2009, Martella et al., 2007). Cancellation of horse events and movement restrictions in 
addition to good hygiene practices and vaccination are the commonly used control strategies 
(Guthrie et al., 1999). In the following sections, we provide some background information 
about the 2007 equine influenza outbreak in Australia and the Australian EAD response 
system to provide a context for the readers before discussing methods and results of the 
current study. 
The outbreak 
For more than four months during 2007 in Australia, the equine influenza virus spread over 
an area of approximately 280,000 square kilometres, affecting horses in the two states of 
New South Wales (NSW)and Queensland, and infecting in total about 70 thousand horses 
on over nine thousand properties. The outbreak was first confirmed in the general horse 
population on 25th August 2007 and successful eradication was announced by animal health 
authorities on 30 June 2008 following the detection of the last known case on 11 January 
2008 and substantial surveillance efforts (EI EISG, 2008). The direct costs of the outbreak 
response to the government were over A$350 million. Additional indirect costs to the industry 
were far higher but difficult to estimate (Webster, 2011). 
The virus inadvertently entered the Sydney quarantine station on 8 August 2007 in infected 
vaccinated horses imported for breeding from Japan (Callinan, 2008). The disease spread 
undetected from these imported horses to local horses, yet the exact means of virus escape 
has not been determined despite being the subject of a thorough legal inquiry (Callinan, 
2008). The initial outbreaks amongst local horses were mostly in rural areas, some distance 
from Sydney. The first local horses infected with equine influenza were competing in an 
equestrian event at Maitland, NSW between 17 and 19 August. Some of the competing 
horses were subsequently moved long distances whilst incubating the disease. At least one 
infected horse likely infected horses competing at another event nearly 400km away at 
Narrabri NSW, the following weekend (24-26 August). Horses returning home from this 
event spread the virus further and interstate into southeast Queensland. Most subsequent 
cases were either linked to these two events or were the result of local spread over 
distances of around 28km from premises infected in the first few weeks of the epidemic 
(Cowled et al., 2009, Davis et al., 2009, Firestone et al., 2011).  
Following the confirmation of the first case in local horses on August 25th, the national 
Consultative Committee for Emergency Animal Diseases (CCEAD) recommended an initial 
national horse movement ban of 72 hours in accordance with the pre-existing national 
response policy, the AUSVETPLAN for Equine Influenza. Subsequent voluntary 
implementation of the horse movement ban by the states and territories occurred at various 
times later that day, including legal enforcement of it in NSW. However, the state of 
Queensland did not legally enforce the movement ban until 26th August and the Northern 
Territory waited until 27th August (EI EISG, 2008). Initially, animal health authorities identified 
and quarantined infected properties by implementation of restricted areas surrounding 
infected premises with a 10km radius and controlling access. On 17th September, the 
National Management Group endorsed CCEAD’s decision for vaccination as a control 
strategy and variation in the response plan to introduce risk-based zoning. Animal health 
authorities in the two affected states introduced colour-based restriction zoning with different 
levels of movement restrictions in different zones depending on risk (Scott-Orr, 2011). In the 
state of NSW only, a special restricted area with free internal horse movement was 
implemented from late September in areas of high horse density and infection. The special 
restricted area was modified in mid October from two initially separate areas to one large 
special restricted zone (Scott-Orr, 2011).  
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Vaccination supplies arrived in Australia on 28th September. Vaccination commenced in 
NSW and Queensland on the 29th September and in Victoria on the 1st October (EI EISG, 
2008). The emergency vaccination strategy in NSW included ring vaccination in a buffer 
zone around infected areas, targeted vaccination of high-risk enterprises (such as racing 
precincts) and blanket vaccination within affected areas. In Queensland, in addition to 
targeted vaccination, animal health authorities originally planned ring vaccination starting 
10km from the nearest infected property and around major clusters of infection, yet, the plan 
was changed on 26th September to a single outer vaccination buffer zone surrounding the 
entire area of infection. From 16th October, an inner vaccination buffer zone was established 
and further strategic vaccination commenced on 25th October. Between October and 
December mass, blanket vaccination was performed in Queensland (EI EISG, 2008). 
The Australian emergency animal disease response system 
Australia’s political framework is a federal constitutional parliamentary democracy, in which 
there is an overarching federal parliament and states or territories with their own parliament. 
Responsibility for an EAD outbreak is shared between Federal and State/Territory 
governments in a complex way (Post et al., 2004, Animal Health Australia, 2008).  
The structures of the system during normal operations and during an emergency animal 
disease outbreak are shown in Figure 11.  
A member of the AHC, Animal Health Australia, is a not-for-profit public company with 
government and industry members, which coordinates collaborative animal health programs, 
administers finances and audits program effectiveness. During the 2007 equine influenza 
outbreak, Animal Health Australia also undertook an operational role in obtaining and 
distributing vaccine from overseas (Perkins et al., 2011). As part of the Emergency Animal 
Disease Preparedness Program, Animal Health Australia oversees the government and 
livestock Industry Cost Sharing Deed in respect of Emergency Animal Disease, referred to 
as the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) and the Australian 
Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), which includes specific response strategies for 
>30 diseases (Animal Health Australia, 2011).  
Prior to the 2007 equine influenza outbreak, Animal Health Australia had prepared an 
AUSVETPLAN for technical control of an incursion as well as a specific cost-sharing 
agreement for equine influenza. However, horse industry input and commitment to both of 
these was uneven. Compared to other Australian livestock industries, the horse industry is 
unique in that it is comprised of multiple sectors and groups such as several breeding and 
sporting associations and societies, equestrian sports, recreational activities and racing. 
However only three horse industry groups were members of Animal Health Australia at the 
time of the 2007 outbreak, namely the Australian Racing Board, representing thoroughbred 
racing, Harness Racing Australia and the Australian Horse Industry Council, representing 
the racing, performance and pleasure horse industries (Glanville and Christie, 2011). 
Despite the national arrangements emergency preparedness arrangements, the 
responsibility for disease control within state or territory jurisdictions lies with the relevant 
CVO, who acts in concurrence with the jurisdiction’s disease control headquarters, one or 
more local disease control centres and state emergency arrangements including services 
such as police, transport and community departments (Animal Health Australia, 2008). 
Despite the existence of well-established Australian emergency disease preparedness and 
response programs (which included industry representation), to our knowledge no objective 
and independent evaluation of stakeholder involvement in an EAD outbreak response has 
been previously conducted, despite such stakeholder involvement being critical for an 
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effective response (Conkey, 2004, Conkey et al., 2004). Two established risk-based 
frameworks for animal health or primary industry policy decision-making were available from 
two Australian jurisdictions (Cameron et al., 2005, Jenner, 2008), however no information 
was available about whether these frameworks equally apply to exotic animal disease 
response and in other Australian jurisdictions. The two available frameworks were used as a 
basis in this investigation to, inductively, identify potential gaps in existing theory. 
In this study, a mixed methods approach was used to ascertain and describe stakeholder 
relationships and sources of risk influencing technical policy decision-making processes 
during the 2007 equine influenza response. The study results will inform models of risk 
management and initiatives to increase preparedness for future EAD incursions. 
 
Methods: 
Identification of stakeholders and policy decisions 
To focus the study on specific policy decisions and to identify relevant stakeholders, the 
available literature on the 2007 EI outbreak in Australia was reviewed. Stakeholders in this 
study were defined as “Individuals, groups and organisations, who have an interest and the 
potential to influence the policy direction” (Brugha and Varvasovszky, 2000). All individuals, 
groups and organisations mentioned in the literature in connection with the specific policy 
issues were identified in order to invite their participation in the research interviews. In 
addition, during the interviews, participants were shown a list of all stakeholders considered 
and asked whether any additional stakeholders as per definition should be contacted for 
participation in the study. 
The pre-existing national policy document  the equine influenza AUSVETPLAN, which 
outlines a technical response plan for an equine influenza outbreak (Animal Health Australia, 
2007)  was compared to decisions made during the actual EI outbreak, based on a 
preliminary report from an equine influenza epidemiology support group to the CCEAD (EI 
EISG, 2008). Six policy decisions, marking deviations from the pre-existing AUSVETPLAN 
policy or differing interpretations by different states, were identified and used to frame 
subsequent semi-structured interviews.  
Questionnaire design and implementation 
A semi-structured questionnaire was developed to collect both quantitative and qualitative 
data for a parallel mixed analysis, since quantitative methods alone are limited in describing 
social phenomena and hence require supplementation by qualitative data analysis (Yin, 
2011). The questionnaire was pre-tested with three individuals, representing the NSW 
Department of Primary Industries, and modified according to the feedback obtained. The 
final questionnaire consisted of 12 questions and on average took 40 minutes to conduct. 
Half of the questions were quantitative in nature and explored stakeholder group’s self-rated 
level of support of, interest in and influence on six selected policies as well as the nature of 
impact caused by the policy and their relationships with other stakeholders using ordinal 
response categories. The other half of the interview comprised qualitative exploration of 
driving factors and risk perceptions regarding the six identified policy decisions. All 
interviews were conducted face-to-face and when permitted by the interviewee, were audio-
recorded. Interviewees were asked about their professional background and involvement in 
the 2007 equine influenza outbreak, their organisation’s influence on various policy 
developments and decisions, the reasoning for decisions and some perceptions on the 
influence and interest of other stakeholder groups as well as their own organisation’s 
representation in the decision-making processes.  
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In total, 15 Australian mainland based organisations were identified as stakeholders and all 
15 were approached to participate in this study. Interviewees were recruited by an invitation 
sent to each stakeholder organization that requested the individuals who had been active in 
the EI outbreak be identified to participate in an interview. If no response was received after 
10 working days of initial sending, a reminder email was sent and if no response to this then 
no further attempt to contact the organisation was made.  
Quantitative data analysis 
Contingency tables were prepared  policy issues versus stakeholder responses  from 
individual level data. Due to many cells with zero counts, the categories of responses were 
collapsed to create binary outcomes representing stakeholder’s level of support of, interest 
in and influence on the six selected policies. Generalised linear mixed model analyses were 
then conducted to evaluate differences in stakeholder responses for various policy issues by 
including organisations as a random effect. 
The data from questions with ordinal response categories were also used to describe 
stakeholder’s level of support of, interest in and influence on selected policies in a heat map 
using spreadsheet software (Microsoft Office Excel, 2007). In this analysis, data were 
presented at the organisational level and in cases in which more than one person responded 
from an organisation, the data used represents the percent of respondents supporting a 
particular position. 
Additionally, these data were used to conduct policy network analyses (Ucinet 6 for analysis; 
(Borgatti et al., 2002) and the identified networks illustrated (Netdraw; (Borgatti, 2002). 
Again, data were at the organisational-level and in cases in which more than one person 
responded per organisation the median response was used for network analyses.  
Analysis of qualitative data 
Theory-oriented process tracing was used to analyse qualitative data to explore whether 
technical decision-making for equine influenza control exemplified the previously suggested 
general framework for endemic animal health decision-making (Cameron et al., 2005). This 
method relies on the theoretical proposition that factors other than classical epidemiological 
evidence (data on infected premises, spatiotemporal pattern of infection, predictions of 
outbreak duration and spatial extent) such as social, political or financial factors drive 
technical decision-making during an EAD outbreak. 
The management and analysis of the qualitative data were performed using  QSR-NVivo 
software (QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 9, 2010), as illustrated by others (Bringer et al., 
2006, Hutchison et al., 2010). This software allowed documented coding and characterising 
of large amounts of narrative texts or recordings, data pattern matching to the pre-defined 
theory (Cameron et al., 2005) and creation of data display graphics (Yin, 2003). 
The University of Sydney Human Ethics committee approved the study protocol (project 
number: 12916). 
 
Results:  
Identification of stakeholders and policy decisions 
Of the 15 stakeholder groups that were approached based on the initial document review, 12 
agreed to participate, two did not respond and one did not agree to participate. Five of these 
stakeholder groups were from industry, four were from government, two were service 
providers and one was a public company (Table 1). Semi-structured interviews were 
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conducted between February and May 2011 with 24 individuals representing the 12 
organisations.  
The pre-existing national AUSVETPLAN policy framework for an equine influenza incursion 
(Animal Health Australia, 2007) was compared with a subsequent summary report of 
available literature that outlined the course of decision-making during the outbreak (EI EISG, 
2008). Six policy issues were identified that represented modifications or differing 
interpretations of AUSVETPLAN by state government authorities (Table 2). First, at the initial 
start of the outbreak, the commencement times of the voluntary movement ban, and 
subsequently of legal enforcement of the compulsory movement ban in the affected states 
differed between jurisdictions. Second, in NSW, the case definition used for an infected 
property changed from laboratory based to non-laboratory based during the peak of the 
outbreak. Third, risk-based zoning was not considered in the pre-existing AUSVETPLAN, 
nor was the fourth issue, use of a special restricted area. Fifth, in a similar manner, pre-
emptive vaccination in non-infected jurisdictions was not discussed in the national policy. 
The last issue of differing interpretations by different jurisdictions referred to the Queensland 
vaccination strategy of implementing an outer and an inner vaccination buffer zone. 
Stakeholders’ position on identified policy issues 
Of the 24 individuals interviewed, 75-100% supported, had interest in and considered the 
outcome as good for the four policy decisions: implementation of a national horse movement 
ban, alteration of NSW case definition, implementation of risk-based zoning and of a special 
restricted zone extension (Table 3). However, only 46-75% of those interviewed considered 
that they had influence on the six different decisions.  
Although a lower proportion of the interviewees supported, had interest in or perceived the 
outcome to be good for the other two policy decisions  vaccination in non-combat states 
and Queensland vaccination strategy  the differences were not statistically significant.  
A description of each stakeholder group’s position on the six identified policy issues is 
presented in Table 3. Overall, there was a high level of interest in all policy issues, yet the 
case definition change in NSW and the vaccination strategy in Queensland elicited less 
interest from government agencies in other jurisdictions and the Australian Horse Industry 
Council. Despite some organisations perceiving a neutral or negative outcome about the 
movement ban and case definition, there was wide support for both decisions. Similarly, the 
two zoning issues were largely supported and seen as a good outcome by all industry group 
representatives. Vaccination in non-combat states was not (neutral or opposed) or only 
partially supported by Animal Health Australia, the service providers (Australian Animal 
Health Laboratory and Equine Veterinarian Association), the combat state agencies and the 
Australian Horse Industry Council, yet the other industry groups were supportive and most 
accepted that it was a good outcome.  
The Australian Racing Board was the only industry group to rate itself as influential regarding 
all decisions made. All other industry groups rated themselves to have been influential on 
the special restricted zone extension in NSW and vaccine distribution to non-combat states, 
except Harness Racing Australia whose representatives did not rate the organisation as 
influential regarding the zone extension (Table 3).  
Stakeholder interactions 
Stakeholder network diagrams indicating formal relationships and level of communications 
between stakeholders are shown in Figure 2. Combining strong and weak relationships 
(Figure 2a/c), both networks have a diameter of two maximum links to connect each node 
and both networks are very dense (density = 0.91 and 0.83, respectively) providing good 
coverage (Table 4). The median in- and out-degrees approach the maximum of 11 
8 
 
connections from and to each organisation. However, further examination of the non-existing 
formal relationships identified gaps between animal health departments of uninfected/non-
combat states, the two service providers, and the equestrian and thoroughbred breeding 
industry groups (Figure 2b). Similar gaps were present for the level of communications 
except that the Equine Veterinary Association had communication channels with the other 
stakeholders (Figure 2d).  
Qualitative data analyses revealed that during the outbreak, government and industry 
stakeholders interacted through pre-existing / pre-planned organisational structures and 
communication arrangements such as Animal Health Australia, the National Management 
Group and the CCEAD as well as through alliances formed in reaction to the outbreak. Five 
of nine industry interviewees broadly supported and praised Animal Health Australia 
regarding their professionalism, logistics and communications role during the outbreak 
control as illustrated in this comment: 
“Animal Health Australia were terrific! They used their existing industry forums and 
newsletters to communicate with the horse industry.” 
However, Thoroughbred Breeders Australia and the Equestrian Federation Australia were 
not directly represented through Animal Health Australia and, based on interviews, did not 
feel adequately represented through the existing structures. Under strong individual 
leadership by their president, Thoroughbred Breeders Australia directly addressed the 
federal minister making a business case for horse movement being required for breeding 
activities. This action was followed by the Equestrian Federation Australia, which made a 
business case for high-level performance horses needing to travel in order to partake in 
qualification events for the 2008 Olympic Games. The other industry sectors considered 
Thoroughbred Breeders Australia and the Australian Racing Board as preferentially treated 
(n=9 interviewees) and their perception was also recognised by some interviewees 
representing government authorities (n=5 interviewees): 
“The thoroughbred breeders were the squeakiest wheel and perhaps received 
preferential treatment.” 
In response to the Equestrian Federation Australia’s direct request to the minister, regarding 
movement/travel of horses considered ‘Olympic hopefuls’, they were appointed as an 
observer on the National Management Group despite not being a member of Animal Health 
Australia. 
Differences in emergency disease preparedness of different states were observed, as 
interviews revealed that existing government-industry liaison officers were employed in the 
states of Victoria (which conducted an equine influenza simulation exercise in 2005) and in 
Queensland (based on previous outbreaks of endemic Hendra virus in that state).  
Based on interviews, under-representation of the non-racing sectors of the industry through 
the pre-outbreak national arrangements (CCEAD and NMG) was compensated through 
reactive alliances. The two states with active infection formed a state Ministerial Taskforce 
(in NSW) and the Performance and Pleasure Horse Industry Crisis Committee (in 
Queensland) in order to specifically represent the non-racing sector’s diverse interests in 
each state.  
In addition to issues raised regarding under-representation, other criticisms of existing 
organisational structures raised by 10 interviewees included technical discussions at CCEAD 
being too lengthy. These were important for non-combat states to understand the full picture 
and to continue supporting the national cost sharing, yet too time-consuming for combat 
state representatives. Interviewees argued that due to individual state implementation of 
policy and different local conditions and disease foci, the operational focus of CVOs at the 
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CCEAD should have been of a strategic nature. Technical details should be part of each 
jurisdiction’s disease headquarters’ responsibility for implementation. At the same time, the 
lack of uniformity in movement policies between neighbouring states was lamented as it 
caused confusion and frustration among horse owners. However, although each jurisdiction 
is responsible for disease control within its boundaries, the response is governed by a 
national cost-sharing agreement. Novel policy departures, such as the introduction of risk-
based zoning, must be established as a concept at the national level first, followed by 
national approval of implementation in the individual jurisdictions in order to ensure funding 
under the national arrangements.  
Other criticisms of existing structures included a limited number of working groups to discuss 
technical issues, which were then discussed in detail at CCEAD distracting from decision-
making and untimely or ineffective communication between the CCEAD, National 
Management Group and industry due to poor communication structures or signed 
confidentiality agreements. Interviewees also stated that private veterinarians/members of 
Equine Veterinarian Association represented a sought-after human resource for Animal 
Health Australia and state departments, particularly for vaccination rollout due to their local 
knowledge, technical skills and ability to communicate technical issues to owners. However, 
issues emerged for veterinarians concerning different salaries and regional procedures. 
Factors influencing technical decision-making 
The stakeholder interviews revealed five distinct sources of risk that influenced the technical 
decision-making processes: social, political, financial, operational and strategic (Figure 3). 
These interplayed to various degrees depending on the policy issue: 
Implementation of national horse movement ban 
Implementation of the national horse movement ban by the different states was influenced 
by different levels of disease surveillance and preparedness. During the early stages of the 
outbreak equine influenza appeared to be limited to NSW. With these relatively manageable 
boundaries, the CCEAD/National Management Group committees made a strategic decision 
in accordance with the AUSVETPLAN policy to attempt eradication. A major industry player, 
the Australian Racing Board, supported this by cancellation of race meetings prior to 
announcement of the national horse movement ban. 
Alteration of NSW case definition 
Changing the case definition from laboratory-based to clinical signs only in high risk areas or 
where there was high-risk contact during the peak of the epidemic was considered by most 
stakeholders as a NSW DPI strategic decision. It allowed targeting of resources on the 
periphery of the outbreak as well as benefiting operational resource constraint (time to take 
samples and wait for results and number of veterinarians required to collect samples) and 
lessening the nationally shared financial burden associated with laboratory diagnosis (due to 
the cost-share agreement). 
Implementation of risk-based zoning 
Based on the collected data, the idea of risk-based zoning appeared to have originated in 
several different organisations. It was seen as a strategic decision to create a barrier ahead 
of the disease front, bringing operational benefits such as freeing staff and quarantine 
equipment resources. In addition, there were calls from industry stakeholders to mitigate the 
impacts of disease by allowing movement outside the restricted areas to ensure business 
continuity and to limit social impacts. 
Special restricted zone extension in NSW 
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The NSW DPI implemented a decision to link two special restricted areas to allow for horse 
movements within this larger area and to mitigate industry impacts. The linkage occurred 
following socio-political lobbying to gain financial benefits through business continuity. It was 
also a strategic decision technically because horse movement within these areas of high 
horse density and high disease incidence allowed quick virus ‘burn-out’ in that the virus 
could no longer spread due to lack of susceptible horses. It also reduced some social 
impacts, letting owners get back to their normal routine. 
Vaccination in non-combat states 
Delivery of vaccine to non-combat states was a contentious issue. Initial vaccine stocks were 
limited and combat states fighting acute disease demanded vaccine to support their 
eradication campaigns, whilst non-combat states wanted pre-emptive vaccination to protect 
horses, particularly valuable stock such as racehorses and horses short-listed for the 
Olympic Games. Delivery of vaccine to Victoria was viewed as being influenced by financial / 
political motivation due to the running of the Melbourne Cup and Victorian racing spring 
carnival and the associated government revenue (through tourism and gambling). In 
addition, the spring carnival provided a source of income for the Australian Racing Board 
who undertook profit sharing among the states; hence, it was also seen as benefitting 
members of the affected racing industries in NSW and Queensland. Despite initial fears of 
vaccine shortage in the combat states, interviewees also viewed the decision as strategic as 
it maintained political will and kept non-combat states and the racing industry (who asked for 
ongoing vaccination) on-side with the eradication campaign funded under a national cost-
sharing agreement. Furthermore, it was seen as good public policy because it benefitted 
Victorian taxpayers. 
Queensland vaccination strategy 
Regarding the vaccination strategy in Queensland, consideration of local knowledge of 
private veterinary practitioners was instrumental for a change from the initial vaccination 
strategy, which was considered ineffective in controlling disease spread. The interviewed 
stakeholders were wary that resources may have been wasted by the wide outer buffer 
zone, but admitted that Queensland had different topographic and horse density conditions 
compared to New South Wales and the ideal buffer size was difficult to judge at the time, yet 
overall it achieved its purpose of disease eradication. 
The most frequently mentioned issue associated with policy development and 
implementation was managing public expectations and delivering information, thereby 
reacting to or proactively dealing with public and political pressure. Twelve interviewees 
stressed the social impacts of the disease incursion, including the novel methods required to 
deal with community expectations  such as Facebook, Twitter and monitoring and rectifying 
false rumours on internet forums for horse owners (n=8 interviewees). The importance of 
consideration of social impacts in decision-making underlined the importance of 
government–industry communications. 
 
Discussion: 
This study was conducted to elucidate stakeholder involvement and factors influencing 
technical policy decision-making processes during the control of the 2007 Australian 
outbreak of equine influenza. Australia’s animal health authorities were well prepared for an 
equine influenza outbreak, yet there was generally an underestimation of the size and scope 
of the industry evident from the fact that not all industry stakeholder groups were involved in 
prior efforts to prepare for an exotic disease incursion, which was counteracted by political 
interference during the outbreak. Movement restrictions to control the outbreak resulted in 
11 
 
immediate economic and political crisis (Hoare, 2011) requiring a risk management 
approach to alleviate impacts as much as possible. A lack of connection between the risk 
management process and the emergency management process hinders primary industry 
emergency management and transparency in decision-making (Jenner, 2008). Transparent 
action, mitigation of impacts and good coordination and collaboration within and across 
sectors are features of successful emergency risk management (Boin and t'Hart, 2010). 
This study identified five categories of risk considered in equine influenza technical decision-
making processes, namely strategic, operational, financial, political and social. These 
categories are consistent with the theoretic framework regarding policy decision-making for 
endemic animal disease control in the state of Victoria (Cameron et al., 2005) and other 
work regarding preparedness for primary industries emergencies in the state of South 
Australia (Jenner, 2008). No additional risk sources were identified, yet the context in which 
decisions were made was also an important influence, as supported by a commonly used 
policy analysis framework (Walt and Gilson, 1994). 
Interviewees in this study identified mitigation of socio-political impacts and collaboration 
with the horse industry as the most critical factor during equine influenza control. Political 
interference, as identified in this study, is recognised as a disabler of primary emergency 
preparedness as it tends to occur in response to public pressures  exaggerated by media 
exposure  and results in decisions made at the political level, which are not in accordance 
with established response plans and systems (Jenner, 2008). Better communication of 
priority decision-making may also prevent perceptions of favouritism of one sector as 
observed in this study (Boin and t'Hart, 2010). 
As reported in the results, two industry groups were not directly represented through AHA at 
the national level. This lead to both organisations making a business case to the federal 
minister and subsequently one of them (Equestrian Federation Australia) was appointed as 
observer on the National Management Group. Additionally, other alliances (state Ministerial 
Taskforce in NSW and Performance and Pleasure Horse Industry Crisis Committee in 
Queensland) were formed during the outbreak at the state level between the non-racing 
horse industry sectors and the state ministers/animal health departments. Hence, reactive 
alliances and political interference during the response were associated with some 
stakeholders’ lack of prior involvement in the system and dissatisfaction with the response 
and not in accordance with the EAD control model arrangements. Dissatisfaction was 
possibly also derived from an ineffective risk communication strategy (Delgado et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the outbreak context was important for the forming of those alliances and 
social pressure on animal health authorities: the outbreak occurred concurrently with the 
start of the horse equestrian event season, including Olympic qualification events, the spring 
racing carnivals and the thoroughbred breeding season, all which were dependent on horse 
movements (Hoare, 2011). In Victoria, equine influenza control policy was dominated by 
potentially disastrous impacts on the Melbourne Cup, with wider repercussions for Victorian 
business and the public. At the time of the 2007 outbreak of equine influenza the Australian 
federal Minister for Agriculture (which included responsibility for plant and animal quarantine) 
was a Victorian and a member of the  National Party (which represents rural interests). The 
minister had a personal interest in the thoroughbred breeding and racing industries and 
following his political career he has worked for both, the Australian Racing Board and the 
Thoroughbred Breeders Australia.  
Good political, government, industry and community awareness of the potential impacts of a 
an EAD incursion are important for a successful response as it encourages people to take 
mitigation measures more serious (Jenner, 2008). The pre-existing equine influenza 
technical response plan and government-industry relations facilitated by Animal Health 
Australia are evidence of the outbreak risk awareness and preparedness at the national level 
(Animal Health Australia, 2007), together with ongoing collaborations of all CVOs on the 
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Animal Health Committee. Also, the 2005 equine influenza simulation exercises raised 
additional awareness as well as establishing important government-industry relationships in 
the state of Victoria (Horse Alert Victoria, 2006), yet the other jurisdictions’ government and 
industry organisations may have been less aware of the implications of an equine influenza 
outbreak prior to 2007. Arguably, the strong initial support from one of the key industries  
the Australian Racing Board  marked by cancellation of all race meetings, was influenced 
by the conduct of the simulation exercise (co-funded by the state organisation under the 
Australian Racing Board umbrella) which raised general awareness. As a result, the rapid 
industry support for the 2007 disease eradication can be attributed, among other factors, to 
good preparedness. A long history of preparedness planning (Animal Health Australia, 2008) 
together with successful experiences of major livestock disease eradication built on strong 
collaborations and trust between government and industry (Lehane, 1996), contributed to 
Australia’s animal health agencies being unified in their decision to eradicate the disease, 
despite this having never been achieved in any other country.  
Good preparedness was also displayed in dense stakeholder networks facilitated by Animal 
Health Australia, yet there were noticeable gaps between the non-Animal Health Australia 
member industry organisations, the Thoroughbred Breeders Australia and the Equestrian 
Federation Australia and the uninfected, non-combat state government departments. 
Qualitative analyses supplemented quantitative network analyses by identifying direct 
approaches to these groups by the combat state agencies and the groups’ establishment of 
critical links directly to the federal agency to make their case for business survival, relying on 
horse movements (thoroughbred breeding and travel of Olympic hopefuls), despite being 
formally represented through Australian Horse Industry Council as part of the broader horse 
industry. Stronger engagement of those groups in the future is recommended for a more 
effective response.  
Descriptive quantitative analyses also revealed discrepancies between Australian Horse 
Industry Council’s and other industry groups’ position, particularly regarding vaccination in 
non-combat states and in Queensland. These may suggest poor representation of industry 
organisations by the Australian Horse Industry Council, which is supported by their own 
lament about a fragmented industry (AHIC, 2011). It can also be argued that the 
Thoroughbred Breeders Australia and Australian Racing Board represent each other’s 
interests, as nearly 85% of breeders are involved with racehorse ownership and breeders 
have an interest in 63% of racehorses in training (Geelen, 2010). The thoroughbred racing 
and breeding sectors were viewed by other industry sectors as being treated preferentially, 
yet this can be explained by their comparatively well-structured and well-supported industry 
providing human resources and demographic information as well as performing services 
such as vaccination on behalf of the animal health authorities (Arthur and Suann, 2011, 
Glanville and Christie, 2011). In addition to under-representation of industry sectors through 
the pre-existing structures, there were other weaknesses regarding the system mentioned. 
Lack of correct understanding about roles was an issue, with differing interpretations of what 
constitutes a technical issue for decision and implementation at a state level versus a 
technical issue that required national discussion and approval. Misinterpretation of roles and 
responsibilities is recognised to hinder emergency management, as non-standard roles are 
adopted and training of roles, responsibilities and systems is required (Jenner, 2008).  
Many interviewees agreed that the pre-existing AUSVETPLAN provided good technical 
guidance and that one of its strengths lay in flexibility of interpretation by each jurisdiction 
depending on the local context. However, differences in response by jurisdictions need to be 
communicated carefully to avoid confusion and frustration, leading to unwillingness of 
stakeholders to support the response (Conkey, 2004, Conkey et al., 2004). In addition the 
existing system allows for disease control concepts not considered in the AUSVETPLAN to 
be flexibly integrated into the response after national approval, as was the case with the 
equine influenza control zoning: Firstly the process required establishment of a national 
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framework for disease control zoning in the case of an equine influenza incursion and 
secondly each infected state had to apply for approval of zoning implementation according to 
the national framework. The national framework is required to make the decision-making 
process objective and to proof decisions made during the response for critical review by a 
royal commission following the campaign. At an operational implementation level, this 
process was viewed as too slow for effective action. Yet, overall the system was perceived 
as working very effectively, demonstrated through the overall success of the campaign and 
the quantitative results that most respondents were supportive of the major decisions made 
and considered most policy outcomes as good. 
The study results are strengthened by the use of triangulation of data sources and 
methodologies to create complementing and converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003). Gaps in 
quantitative policy network analyses illustrated missing linkages between stakeholders, 
which were then explained through qualitative analyses. Qualitative data analyses further 
described stakeholder interaction not obvious from the quantitative data and explained the 
policy context. The study is focused on interactions between stakeholders at the top-level 
nationally. Yet, the scope of this study was to assess technical decision-making marking 
deviations from or modifications to AUSVETPLAN and hence the decisions of interest are 
subject to national cost-sharing arrangements and scrutiny at the national level. 
The quantitative policy network analyses performed in this study illustrates stakeholder 
relationships visually, yet they were subject to a number of limitations. The networks 
presented are incomplete due to some organisations refusing to participate. Some additional 
horse industry organisations were seen as stakeholders by some participants, despite not 
meeting the study definition as directly having influence or having the power to influence the 
policy issues discussed in this study. Another limitation is the representation of entire 
organisations  including different units within an organisation  by one or a few 
representatives. The industry bodies were contacted through their national representative 
body as these were on NMG and CCEAD committees, yet during the course of the study it 
became apparent that the state branches of industry bodies were very active and directly 
dealing with their respective animal health department, particularly so in NSW and 
Queensland. The self-reported levels of influence of national organisations thus may or may 
not be a realistic perception of the industry sectors influence; however, it reflects a 
perception of their representation in decision-making.  
The qualitative analyses used in this study are transparent through the use of QSR NVivo 
software (Bringer et al., 2006, Hutchison et al., 2010). However, these types of analyses are 
prone to three types of bias: information bias may be present because interviewees are 
more likely to report events closer to their role and areas of responsibility and technically 
more available to them; confirmation bias, as an interviewer may want to confirm a known 
hypothesis or a interviewees may want to confirm a theory; and ‘predictable world bias’, 
where people seek order where it may not exist. Despite its limitations, the qualitative 
approach has its strengths in complementing the conducted quantitative analyses and in 
reflecting the perceived reality of participants and their views on organisation who did not 
participate in this study. 
In conclusion, using a mixed method approach this study described pre-existing and reactive 
stakeholder relationships and risk areas (strategic, operational, socio-political and financial) 
influencing animal health policy decision-making processes as well as the policy context. 
The findings support existing theory and stress the need for stakeholder consideration and 
the utilisation of risk management principles in developing animal health policy. 
Recommendations arising from this work include training to increase awareness and 
knowledge of potential EAD impacts as well as of existing response systems such as 
national committees, Ausvetplans and cost-sharing agreements. 
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Figure 1: Simplified diagrammatic representation of Australian national animal health 
arrangements in general and during an emergency animal disease (EAD) incident, adapted 
from Animal Health Australia (2012). 
*Includes industry representation based on industry organisation’s membership of Animal Health 
Australia. 
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Figure 2: Network diagrams illustrating a.) all self-rated formal relationships, b.) highlighting 
non-existing formal relationships, c.) all self-rated communication channels and d.) 
highlighting no communications between stakeholders in the technical control of equine 
influenza during the 2007 outbreak in Australia. Circle = government organisation; square = 
industry organisation; triangle = public company; diamond = service provider. NSW DPI = New South 
Wales Department of Primary Industries; QDPI&F = Queensland Department of Primary Industries & 
Fisheries; VIC DPI = Victorian Department of Primary Industries; DAFWA = Department of Agriculture 
and Food, Western Australia; CSIRO AAHL = Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation, Australian Animal Health Laboratory; EVA = Equine Veterinarians Australia; AHA = 
Animal Health Australia; AHIC = Australian Horse Industry Council; EFA = Equestrian Federation 
Australia; ARB = Australian Racing Board; TBA = Thoroughbred Breeders Australia; AHR = Australian 
Harness Racing Council. 
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Figure 3: Diagram of concepts explaining policy decision-making during the 2007 technical 
equine influenza control in Australia. Filled arrows indicate influences; non-filled arrows indicate 
considerations; ovals = stakeholder interactions; rounded squares = policy environmental conditions; 
squares = influencing factors.  
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Table 1: Description of stakeholders regarding technical disease control policies during the 
2007 equine influenza outbreak in Australia 
Stakeholder Acronym Organisation type Description of stake 
New South Wales Department of 
Primary Industries 
NSW DPI State government 
Disease containment 
and eradication in 
NSW 
Queensland Department of 
Primary Industries & Fisheries 
(now part of the Department of 
Employment, Economic 
development and Innovation) 
QDPI&F State government 
Disease containment 
and eradication in 
Queensland. 
Victorian Department of Primary 
Industries 
VIC DPI State government 
Preventing disease 
spread into Victoria 
and national 
eradication. 
Department of Agriculture and 
Food, Western Australia 
DAFWA State government 
Preventing disease 
spread into Western 
Australia and national 
eradication. 
Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation, 
Australian Animal Health 
Laboratory 
CSIRO AAHL 
Government 
service provider 
Meeting demand for 
laboratory services. 
Equine Veterinarians Australia EVA 
Industry service 
provider 
Informing private 
veterinary 
practitioners. 
Animal Health Australia AHA Public company 
Providing information 
and managing 
vaccination. 
Australian Horse Industry Council AHIC Industry 
Ensuring the meeting 
of members needs. 
Equestrian Federation Australia 
(now Equestrian Australia) 
EFA Industry 
Ensuring the meeting 
of members needs. 
Australian Racing Board ARB Industry 
Ensuring business 
continuity for the 
thoroughbred racing 
industry. 
Thoroughbred Breeders Australia TBA Industry 
Ensuring business 
continuity for the 
breeding industry. 
Australian Harness Racing Council 
(now Harness Racing Australia) 
AHR Industry 
Ensuring business 
continuity for the 
harness racing 
industry. 
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Table 2: Technical policy issues identified as modifications to or different interpretations of 
the equine influenza AUSVETPLAN by different states during the 2007 Australian outbreak 
Date 
Policy issue AUSVETPLAN 2007 policy 
description 
Actual policy 
implementation 
25-27 
Aug 
National 
standstill 
“A rapidly implemented national 
horse movement standstill for a 
prescribed period could minimise 
the risk of further spread of EI 
while the nature and extent of an 
outbreak are being identified.” 
Different times of 
implementation and legal 
enforcement of the national 
standstill in different states 
and territories 
 7 Oct NSW case 
definition 
“A recommended case definition is 
a ‘high morbidity respiratory 
disease in horses involving fever, 
coughing and nasal discharge, 
with or without a risk contact in the 
history.” 
Initial case definition based 
on laboratory testing only, 
followed by declaration of 
infected premises in high-
risk areas or with high-risk 
contacts based on clinical 
signs 
21 Sep  Risk-based 
zoning 
Not indicated in AUSVETPLAN as 
a containment strategy, but zoning 
foreseen as a strategy to facilitate 
exports and for continuation of 
horse events outside infected 
areas 
Variation in response plan 
by introducing risk-based 
zone containment strategy 
 19 Oct Purple zone 
expansion 
Not indicated in AUSVETPLAN Further variation in the 
response plan 
28 Sep Vaccine 
supply to 
non-combat 
states 
“Preemptive vaccination, which 
targets enterprises and 
populations that could be expected 
to contribute most to future spatial 
transmission of infection.” “If an 
Australian outbreak were expected 
to spread rather than be 
contained, all racing horses 
outside the restricted area could 
be vaccinated prophylactically to 
enable racing to continue in 
unaffected areas while the 
eradication effort continues.” 
Controversial distribution to 
unaffected states. 
27 Sep/ 
25 Oct 
Queensland 
vaccination 
strategy 
“It may allow authorities to 
effectively contain the outbreak by 
creating a vaccinated buffer zone 
to reduce the risk of spread from 
the restricted area.” 
Vaccination of infected 
horses in buffer zones in 
NSW versus in an outer 
vaccination buffer zone in 
Queensland followed by an 
inner buffer zone. 
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Table 3: Heat map describing stakeholders’ self-rated level of support, interest and influence on as well as impact caused by six policy decisions 
related to technical equine influenza control in Australia in 2007 
Policy issue Self-rated responses
a
 
AAHL 
(n=1) 
NSW DPI 
(n=5) 
QDPI&F 
(n=3) 
VIC DPI 
(n=2) 
DAFWA 
(n=1) 
AHA 
(n=1) 
EVA 
(n=1) 
AHIC 
(n=3) 
EFA 
(n=2) 
TBA 
(n=1) 
ARB 
(n=1) 
AHR 
(n=2) 
 
             Implementation 
of national 
horse 
movement ban 
Being supportive  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Being interested 100 83 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving a good outcome  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 67 100 0 100 100 
Perceiving to have had influence  100 100 100 100 100 0 0 100 0 100 100 0 
 
             Alteration of 
NSW case 
definition 
Being supportive  100 100 67 100 100 100 100 67 100 100 100 50 
Being interested 100 100 33 50 100 100 100 33 50 100 100 100 
Perceiving a good outcome  100 100 67 100 100 0 0 67 100 100 100 50 
Perceiving to have had influence  100 100 67 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 100 0 
 
             Implementation 
of risk-based 
zoning 
Being supportive  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Being interested 100 100 100 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving a good outcome  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving to have had influence  100 100 100 50 100 0 0 0 50 100 100 50 
 
             Special 
restricted zone 
extension 
Being supportive  100 100 67 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 
Being interested 100 83 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving a good outcome  0 83 33 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving to have had influence  0 83 33 0 100 0 0 67 100 100 100 0 
 
             Vaccination in 
non-combat 
states 
Being supportive  0 50 33 100 100 0 0 33 100 100 100 100 
Being interested 100 67 67 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving a good outcome  0 50 0 100 100 0 0 33 100 100 100 50 
Perceiving to have had influence  0 33 33 100 100 0 0 33 100 100 100 100 
 
             Queensland 
vaccination 
strategy 
Being supportive  0 83 100 100 100 0 0 33 100 100 100 100 
Being interested 0 67 100 50 100 100 100 33 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving a good outcome  0 83 100 100 100 0 0 67 100 100 100 100 
Perceiving to have had influence  0 83 100 0 100 0 0 0 50 100 100 50 
22 
 
a
 % being supported/ interested, perceiving a good outcome/to have influence as opposed to being neutral or opposed/ uninterested/ perceiving a bad 
outcome, perceiving to have no influence. AAHL = Australian Animal Health Laboratory; NSW DPI = New South Wales Department of Primary Industries; 
QDPI&F = Queensland Department of Primary Industries & Fisheries; Vic DPI = Victorian Department of Primary Industries; DAFWA = Department of 
Agriculture and Food Western Australia; AHA = Animal Health Australia; EVA = Equine Veterinarians Australia; AHIC = Australian Horse Industry Council; 
EFA = Equestrian Federation Australia; TBA = Thoroughbred Breeders Australia; ARB = Australian racing Board; AHR = Australian Harness Racing Council. 
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Table 4: Description of networks considering self-rated levels of a) formal relationships and b) 
communications among stakeholder groups regarding technical control policy decisions 
made during the 2007 outbreak of equine influenza in Australia. 
  
Network 
Parameter Formal relationshipsa Communicationsb 
Network size 
  
 
Number of nodes 12 12 
 
Number of directed links 120 109 
 
Size 132 132 
 
Diameter 2 2 
Measures of centrality 
  
 
Median in-degree (range) 10.5 (8-11) 9 (7-11) 
 
Median out-degree (range) 11 (8-11) 9.5 (6-11) 
 
In-degree centralization 0.95 0.82 
 
Out-degree centralization 1 0.86 
Measures of cohesion 
  
 
Density (directed) 0.91 0.83 
 
Median geodesic distance  1 1 
a
 Weak and strong relationships versus no relationship 
b
 Regular or frequent communication versus occasional or no communications. 
         
 
 
